We invite partnerships of researchers and implementers to apply to IPA's Peace & Recovery Initiative to help expand the evidence base on what works to reduce violence and fragility, promote peace, build social cohesion, and prevent, manage, and recover from crises. Proposals are due November 22nd.

In 2023, conflict-related deaths reached their second-highest level in thirty years. With 1.5% of the global population displaced and roughly a quarter living in conflict zones, the urgency for effective peacebuilding, violence reduction, and crisis response approaches has rarely been so great. Since 2017, IPA’s Peace and Recovery (P&R) Initiative, supported by UK International Development and the Open Society Foundations, has contributed to the evidence base on how best to address and recover from conflict, violence, and humanitarian crises. As we launch our eighth call for proposals, we present five emerging insights from our portfolio of 80 impact evaluations and related research projects focused on responding to and preventing fragility. 

 1. Low-cost, light-touch interventions can foster social cohesion. 

Social cohesion interventions often aim to reduce intergroup conflict and encourage cooperation by strengthening social networks and prosocial norms (GCCI, 2021). Recent P&R-supported studies show that low-cost interventions can effectively promote tolerance and empathy. For instance, in post-ISIS Iraq, a study found that mixing Christian and Muslim players on soccer teams fostered inclusion and tolerance (Mousa 2020). In Turkey, a perspective-taking curriculum, designed to foster empathy between Turkish and Syrian refugee students through personal narratives and interactive activities, helped reduce peer violence and improve student interactions (Alan et al. 2021). 
 

2. Trusted community leaders can play key roles in encouraging prosocial behavior. 

When trusted local authorities endorse specific behaviors or beliefs, they can significantly influence followers' attitudes and perceptions of social norms (Hogg 2010; Tankard and Levy Paluck 2016). Engaging these leaders in peacebuilding programs can improve outcomes. For instance, pro-peace radio messages from respected religious leaders in Nigeria not only increased support for reintegrating former Boko Haram members but also enhanced the perception of public support for reintegration (Blair et al. 2021). In Pakistan, individuals who heard an imam promote inter-sectarian harmony while praying with at least one worshiper of another sect improved the likelihood they would select a plumber of another sect to carry out repairs on their home (Chaudhry & Hussain 2023). At times, encouraging leaders to promote prosocial behaviors requires persuasion. For instance, additional research in Pakistan found that personalized telephone calls to local religious leaders significantly increased their likelihood of recommending mask-wearing to their congregants, particularly among those who already understood COVID-19 transmission (Vyborny 2024). However, caution is warranted. While engaging trusted authorities can drive positive behavior and attitude change, programs should be careful to avoid unintended negative effects. For example, in Burkina Faso, recorded pro-peace messages by religious authorities intended to foster social cohesion inadvertently increased intolerance, possibly by intensifying the salience of ethnic identities rather than national unity (Grossman et al. 2022). 
 

3. Economic programs targeted at host communities can contribute to refugee integration. 

Misperceptions and incomplete information can negatively shape host community attitudes toward refugees’ economic integration (Benrey & Kenny 2023). Recent studies suggest that employment subsidies, cash grants, and information campaigns may help shift these views. For instance, employment subsidies for refugee interns altered local employers' perceptions of refugee skills and willingness to hire refugees in the future (Loiacano & Silva-Vargas forthcoming). In a study in Uganda, host community microentrepreneurs who received cash grants labeled as international aid tied to the refugee response significantly increased their support for inclusive refugee hosting policies (Baseler et al. 2023). 
 

4. Popular policing interventions often do not work as expected. 

Law enforcement departments facing high crime rates and public mistrust have adopted and developed new policing strategies, from militarized to community-based approaches, with mixed results. For instance, in Uganda, a community policing approach designed to foster positive interactions between civilians and police had no significant effect on crime rates, police perceptions, or trust in police, and appeared to increase police misconduct, particularly bribery and corruption (Blair et al. 2021). A militarized policing program in Colombia—featuring intense patrols by armed soldiers—did not reduce crime or improve perceptions of safety. Rather, the study suggested that crime may have worsened following the program (Blair & Weintraub 2023). Elsewhere, we see that the mechanisms driving crime reductions are sometimes misattributed. In Brazil, the deployment of militarized motorcycle patrols—armed with heavy weaponry and high-speed motorcycles—reduced homicides and property crimes with fewer arrests, suggesting deterrence rather than just criminal removal as the cause  (Monteiro et al. forthcoming working paper). 
 

5. Common development programs can strengthen resilience to negative shocks without undermining social cohesion. 

Social protection programs can significantly enhance household resilience against negative shocks across various contexts. For instance, a mobile money transfer program for low-income households in Ghana during the COVID-19 pandemic both augmented household economic well-being and promoted public health compliance, particularly among the most vulnerable (Karlan et al. 2022). In Burkina Faso, a social protection program providing cash, asset, and food transfers reduced chronic malnutrition in young children, decreased food insecurity, and boosted productive assets and land size (Bouguen and Dillon 2024). In the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), a low-cost voucher program for essential household items given to both recently displaced individuals and host communities improved adult mental health (Quattrochi et al. 2022). At times, practitioners and policymakers fear that such programs may undermine social cohesion, as some vulnerable community members are given aid while others are not. In both the studies in Burkina Faso and the DRC, however, the program did not lead to any changes in social cohesion. 
 

What’s next? 

As global conflicts rise and development assistance lags behind, identifying cost-effective, evidence-based strategies for prevention, mitigation, and recovery is essential. Our portfolio shows that low-cost approaches can improve outcomes for those affected by conflict, crime, and displacement; it also shows a pressing need for more evidence. We invite researchers and implementers to apply to P&R’s open call for proposals to help expand the evidence base on what works in peacebuilding, conflict prevention, humanitarian response, and recovery programming.