Webinar | Brokering Truces Between Gangs in Latin America: New Evidence on the Effects on Communities

Webinar | Brokering Truces Between Gangs in Latin America: New Evidence on the Effects on Communities

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This webinar was the third webinar in a series presenting innovative research on crime and violence in Latin America and the Caribbean. If you would like to receive updates via email on future webinars in this series, sign up for the series mailing list here.

Gangs like Mara Salvatrucha, or MS-13, are known for having complete territorial control over urban neighborhoods, with violence and extortion as their main activities. In countries with low state capacity, these activities can limit socio-economic development in those areas.

A particularly common and controversial policy, which governments have used in an attempt to limit the negative consequences of gang violence, is to broker a truce between gangs in order to reduce competition. In El Salvador, for example, cooperation between gangs appears to have reduced violence, but little is known about the effect on extortion, the main revenue source for gangs, and the impact on households.

In this webinar, Eduardo Montero (University of Michigan) and Mica Sviatschi (Princeton University) discussed their research on how gangs affect the economic conditions in the areas where they rule, and the role of truces. The presentations were followed by Q&A. This webinar was held in both English and Spanish, with translation provided from English to Spanish and vice versa.

Speakers

Policy Discussant

Moderator


Watch the webinar recording in Spanish:

Watch the webinar recording in English:

City

Webinar

Country

United States