

## Timeline

10-11AM CDT / 11AM-12PM EDT

## Date

April 27, 2021



El Instituto Becker Friedman de la Universidad de Chicago, la Universidad de Princeton e Innovations for Poverty Action lo invitan a participar del próximo seminario web de una serie que presenta investigaciones innovadoras sobre el crimen y la violencia en América Latina y el Caribe:

**Gestionando treguas entre grupos criminales en Latinoamérica: nueva evidencia sobre los efectos en las comunidades**

**Martes 27 de abril de 2021**  
**10-11 AM CDT / 11AM-12PM EDT**

[Regístrate aquí](#)

*El seminario web se llevará a cabo en inglés y en español. Se proporcionará traducción del inglés al español y viceversa.*

Los grupos criminales como la Mara Salvatrucha, o MS-13, son conocidos por mantener un control territorial absoluto sobre vecindarios urbanos que ocupan. En países con estados débiles las actividades principales de estos grupos, la violencia y la extorsión, pueden limitar el desarrollo socioeconómico de las personas que viven bajo su control.

Una medida común pero controversial que utilizan los gobiernos para limitar las consecuencias de la violencia entre pandillas es intentar mediar treguas que reduzcan la competencia entre ellas. Si bien se sabe que la cooperación entre pandillas redujo la violencia en El Salvador, se conoce muy poco sobre sus efectos en las extorsiones, la principal fuente de ingresos de estos grupos criminales, y su impacto en los hogares.

En este webinar, **Eduardo Montero (Universidad de Michigan)** y **Mika Sviatschi (Princeton University)** discutirán su investigación sobre los efectos que tienen estos grupos criminales sobre las condiciones de vida de las familias que viven en sus territorios y el rol que pueden tener las treguas. **Noah Bullock (Cristosal)** discutirá las implicancias de política de este trabajo. Luego de las presentaciones tendremos un espacio de 10 minutos para preguntas.



*Para leer este mensaje en español, haz clic [aquí](#).*

Please join the Becker Friedman Institute (BFI) at the University of Chicago, Princeton University, and Innovations for Poverty Action (IPA) for the third webinar in a series presenting innovative research on crime and violence in Latin America and the Caribbean. If you would like to receive updates via email on future webinars in this series, sign up for the series mailing list [here](#).

**Brokering Truces Between Gangs in Latin America: New Evidence on the Effects on Communities**

**Tuesday, April 27, 2021**  
10-11AM CDT / 11AM-12PM EDT

[Register Now](#)

*This webinar will be held in both English and Spanish. Translation from English to Spanish and vice versa will be provided.*

Gangs like Mara Salvatrucha, or MS-13, are known for having complete territorial control over urban neighborhoods, with violence and extortion as their main activities. In countries with low state capacity, these activities can limit socio-economic development in those areas.

A particularly common and controversial policy, which governments have used in an attempt to limit the negative consequences of gang violence, is to broker a truce between gangs in order to reduce competition. In El Salvador, for example, cooperation between gangs appears to have reduced violence, but little is known about the effect on extortion, the main revenue source for gangs, and the impact on households.

## Webinar | Brokering Truces Between Gangs in Latin America: New Evidence on the Effects on Communities

*This webinar was the third webinar in a series presenting innovative research on crime and violence in Latin America and the Caribbean. **If you would like to receive updates via email on future webinars in this series, sign up for the series mailing list [here](#).***

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source for gangs, and the impact on households.

In this webinar, **Eduardo Montero (University of Michigan)** and **Mica Sviatschi (Princeton University)** discussed their research on how gangs affect the economic conditions in the areas where they rule, and the role of truces. The presentations were followed by Q&A. This webinar was held in both English and Spanish, with translation provided from English to Spanish and vice versa.

## Speakers

- **Maria Micaela Sviatschi**, *Assistant Professor of Economics at Princeton University*
- **Eduardo Montero**, *Assistant Professor at the Ford School of Public Policy at the University of Michigan*

## Policy Discussant

- **Noah Bullock**, *Executive Director at Cristosal*

## Moderator

- **José Pinilla**, *Policy Manager at IPA*
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**Watch the webinar recording in Spanish:**

**Watch the webinar recording in English:**

## City

Webinar

## Country

United States