Can reminders of rules induce compliance?

Experimental evidence from a common pool resource setting

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Motivation



- Behavioural interventions as a (low cost) opportunity to reduce deforestation?
- RCT in 110 community managed forests in Uganda
- Intervention: SMS reminders of forest use rules

Image source: carbonbrief.com

Can SMS reminders of communal forest use rules induce compliance with those rules?

Channels

- Attentiveness and knowledge
- Scrutiny and sanctioning



Preview of results



Increase in self-reported knowledge of forest use rules



- Increase in the *perceived* probability of penalties
- Actual scrutiny and sanctioning are largely unchanged



• Little evidence of reductions in forest use

Contributions to the literature

• Behavioural interventions in environmental economics

• Allcott (2011), Allcott (2014), Grasmick (1991), reviews by Carlsson and Johansson-Stenman, 2012; Brent et al., 2017; Schubert, 2017

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Insights on common pool resource management from an RCT

• Ostrom (1990) and related work

• Changes in scrutiny and sanctioning as intermediate outcomes

• Bateson et al., 2013; Nettle et al., 2013

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Insights on common pool resource management from an RCT


• Ostrom (1990) and related work

• Changes in scrutiny and sanctioning as intermediate outcomes

• Bateson et al., 2013; Nettle et al., 2013

- Use text messages to change contribution to a public good
 - Dale and Strauss (2014); Karlan et al. (2016); Schoar (2011); Larochelle et al., (2019)


Setting



- Study set in 110 villages in Central, West and South-West Uganda
- Community managed forest
- Rules and sanctioning mechanisms in place
- Infringements are frequent

Image source: Global Forest Watch

Forest use and forest use rules at baseline



Pre-registered hypotheses

SMS reminders of forest use rules:



- increase knowledge of forest use rules
- increase attentiveness to forest use rules
- increase actual scrutiny and the willingness to sanction other forest users
- increase the perceived scrutiny and the perceived probability of sanctions by others upon breaking forest use rules



- increase compliance with forest use rules
- reduce forest use


Experimental design

The treatment – SMS text message reminders

- Monthly reminders
- Community-specific rules
- 10 treatment villages
- 70 SMS recipients

Dear [name], please remember that community members can only collect firewood on Wednesdays and Saturdays. Thank you for obeying your community's rules.

Number of SMS reminders by type of forest use rule



Community forest monitoring as additional treatment

- 6 community members measure forest use and threats to the forest on a monthly basis
- Report findings of collective forest use in village meeting
- Display findings on a poster in a public place in the village

Sample and randomization

• 110 villages that do not border each other

• 11 forests

	Villages	Survey respondents (endline)	Attrition
Control	50	533	4.9%
Monitoring	50	527	4.0%
Monitoring & Rules	10	207	6.0%
Total	110	1,267	

- Block randomization based on forest cover, forest cover loss and forest ID
- Attrition is strongly balanced across treatments

Measurement of outcomes



 Knowledge of forest use rules and attentiveness to rules

- Actual and perceived scrutiny and sanctioning
- Non-compliance and self-reported forest use
- Normalized outcomes (z-scores) or indices of z-scores
- Household level forest cover loss rate (satellite)
- Villages level forest use (on-the-ground measures, robustness)

Estimating equation

• $Y_{ijm1} = \alpha_m + \beta_1$ Monitoring_j + β_2 Monitoring_j * Rules_j

 $+\gamma Y_{ijm0}+\delta X_{ij0}+\epsilon_{ijm1}$

- Y_{ijm1} = Outcome for household *i* in village *j* in randomization block
 m at time t=1 (endline)
- Standard errors clustered at the village level

 $Y_{ijm1} = \alpha_m + \beta_1$ Monitoring_j + β_2 Monitoring_j *Rules_j +

 β_3 Monitoring_j *Rules_j*SMS recipient_{ij} + γY_{ijm0} + δX_{ij0} + ϵ_{ijm1}

- SMS $recipient_{ij}$ =1 if household received the SMS reminder
- Not causal since SMS recipients were not randomized within rules treatment villages

11000000	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Variable	Mon, $t=0$	Rules, t=0	Mon, t=1	Rules, $t=1$	Diff. t=0	Diff. t=1
Knowledge and att	entiveness	414 A.	100.00000000		and the second second	August 2000-0115
Knowledge			0.079	0.090		0.011
			(0.569)	(0.495)		(0.046)
Attentiveness			0.036	-0.008		-0.044
			(0.998)	(0.984)		(0.083)
Scrutiny and sancti	ioning		1111111111			
Scrutiny of others			-0.008	-0.082		-0.073
			(0.859)	(0.807)		(0.071)
Sanctioning of others			-0.010	-0.046		-0.036
			(0.730)	(0.699)		(0.060)
Scrutiny by others			0.076	0.034		-0.042
			(0.985)	(0.973)		(0.083)
Sanctioning by others			-0.028	-0.041		-0.013
			(0.623)	(0.612)		(0.052)
Non-compliance an	d forest use	•			March 100 Store	44444
Non-compliance	0.009	-0.005	0.033	0.048	0.003	0.015
	(0.283)	(0.189)	(0.321)	(0.273)	(0.267)	(0.026)
Non-compliance 2	-0.026	0.032	0.053	0.075	-0.006	0.022
	(0.319)	(0.588)	(0.512)	(0.491)	(0.398)	(0.042)
Forest use	-0.025	0.017	0.011	-0.063	-0.008	-0.074**
	(0.319)	(0.592)	(0.413)	(0.334)	(0.384)	(0.032)
Forest use (village)	0.389	0.063	0.091	0.010	-0.326	-0.081
	(1.015)	(0.378)	(0.543)	(0.754)	(0.327)	(0.201)

Table 1: Summary statistics and balance tests

The table reports average outcomes for households receiving only the monitoring treatment (mon) and villages receiving both the community monitorinig and rules SMS reminder treatment (rules) at baseline (t=0) and at endline (t=1). Columns (5) and (6) report differences in means at baseline and endline, respectively. The values in parentheses show standard deviations for the means (Column 1-4) and standard errors for differences (Columns 5-6). * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Results

Effect of SMS reminders on HH in treatment communities

- Raise <u>knowledge</u> of, but not attentiveness to forest use rules
- No evidence of an increase in <u>scrutiny or sanctioning of others</u>
- Significant increase in the **perceived** probability of sanctions by others
- No increase in <u>compliance</u> or systematic reduction in forest use

Within treatment communities SMS recipients have:

- Better <u>self-reported knowledge</u> of forest use rules
- Higher <u>attentiveness</u> to forest use rules
- Are more likely to <u>scrutinize or sanction others</u> for violations of forest use rules
- Feel more closely <u>scrutinized by others</u>
- No evidence that SMS reminders increased <u>compliance</u> or reduced forest use amongst users.

- Community monitoring did not reduce <u>forest use</u> overall
- <u>Displacement</u> from monitored to unmonitored areas
- Likely driver: <u>Fear of sanctions</u>



RCT to test the effectiveness of rules reminders on compliance with rules and forest use



Increase knowledge of forest use rules but not attentiveness



• Increase in the *perceived* likelihood of penalties



• Limited evidence of reduction in forest use

Lessons for policy-makers

- Program needs to ensure take-up
- Nudges can be context-specific
- Program design should reduce leakage risk

Open research question

- Can nudges work in a developing country or communal resource use context?
- (How) can we best improve management of communal resources through external interventions?
- What are the constraints that prevent successful conservation in a developing country context and how can we alleviate those along with conservation interventions?

Thank you for your attention!

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Effects on knowledge and attentiveness



Measuring knowledge and attentiveness through household surveys

Knowledge index capturing

- Self-reported knowledge of forest use rules
- 5 point Likert scale where higher values indicate better knowledge

Objective knowledge of forest use rules

• Index based on a household's ability to identify whether rules limit the collection of forest products or entry into the forest

• Attentiveness

• proxied by the frequency with which households discuss forest use rules



Table 2: Knowledge of and attentiveness to forest use rules

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Knowledge	Self-reported	Objective	Attentiveness
Monitoring	0.124^{*}	0.142^{**}	0.138	0.143**
	(0.067)	(0.065)	(0.090)	(0.067)
Monitoring \times Rules	0.221	0.267*	0.225	-0.124
	(0.147)	(0.144)	(0.192)	(0.152)
$\beta_1 + \beta_2$	0.345	0.409	0.363	0.019
$\beta_1 + \beta_2$ p-value	0.024	0.007	0.070	0.897
Control mean	0.002	0.101	-0.009	-0.019
Lag dep. var.	No	Yes	No	No
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	915	570	915	916

Standard errors (clustered at the village level) in parentheses * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Effects on scrutiny and sanctioning



Measuring scrutiny and sanctioning of others

Scrutiny of others

- Households patrolled the forest frequently
- Households consider it likely that they would notice infringements by neighbours

Sanctioning of others

- Hypothetical: Imagine your neighbor broke a forest use rule. How likely is it that you would scold them/report them to authorities?
- Actual: Have you scolded/reported someone for breaking forest use rules.

Measuring scrutiny and sanctioning of others

Outcome variable	Component household survey questions			
Scrutiny of others	In the past 12 months, have you or members of your household voluntarily patrolled the common pool forest? [Yes=1] Imagine your neighbour broke a rule relating to forest use. How likely is it that you would notice that your neighbour did this? (Likert scale, very likely=5)			
Sanction others	Hypothetical Hypothetical	al Imagine your neighbour broke a rule relating to fore use. How likely is it you would scold your neighbour (Likert scale, very likely=5)		
	Actual	the NFA? (Likert scale, very likely=5) At times, people in this village may break the rules relating to forest use. In the past year, have you personally (i) scolded someone in the villages for breaking the rules? [Yes=1] (ii) reported someone in the village to the LC1, the CFM or CLA or the NFA, for breaking the rules? [Yes=1]		

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Table 3: Scrutiny and sanctioning of others

	51 - 15		
	(1)	(2)	
	Scrutiny of others	Sanctioning others	H
Monitoring	0.040	0.027	
	(0.046)	(0.042)	
Monitoring \times Rules	-0.131	-0.023	
	(0.116)	(0.095)	
$\beta_1 + \beta_2$	-0.091	0.004	
$\beta_1 + \beta_2$ p-value	0.410	0.964	
Control mean	-0.034	-0.017	
Lag dep. var.	No	No	
Controls	Yes	Yes	
Observations	914	916	

Standard errors (clustered at the village level) in parentheses * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table 3: Scrutiny and sanctioning of others

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Scrutiny of others	Sanctioning others	Hypothetical	Actual
Monitoring	0.040	0.027	0.016	0.046
	(0.046)	(0.042)	(0.049)	(0.048)
Monitoring \times Rules	-0.131	-0.023	-0.054	0.043
	(0.116)	(0.095)	(0.116)	(0.110)
$\beta_1 + \beta_2$	-0.091	0.004	-0.038	0.089
$\beta_1 + \beta_2$ p-value	0.410	0.964	0.731	0.429
Control mean	-0.034	-0.017	-0.022	-0.005
Lag dep. var.	No	No	No	No
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	914	916	915	916

Standard errors (clustered at the village level) in parentheses

* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Measuring perceived scrutiny and sanctions by others

• Perceived scrutiny by others

• Imagine you broke a rule relating to forest use. How likely is it that your neighbour would notice that you did this? [very likely=5]

• Perceived probability of sanctions by others

- Hypothetical:
- If a household in this village breaks a rule about forest use, how likely is it that they will receive a penalty? [very likely=5]

• Actual:

• In the past 12 months, have you or members of your household been scolded/received penalties for violating forest use rule. [Yes=1]

Table 4: Scrutiny and sanctioning by others

	(1)	(2)
	Scrutiny by others	Sanctioning by others
Monitoring	0.112	0.004
	(0.069)	(0.039)
Monitoring \times Rules	-0.159	0.149**
0 + 0	(0.151)	(0.072)
$\beta_1 + \beta_2$	-0.048	0.153
$\beta_1 + \beta_2$ p-value	0.732	0.040
Control mean	-0.002	-0.010
Lag dep. var.	No	No
Controls	Yes	Yes
Observations	907	916

Standard errors (clustered at the village level) in parentheses * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table 4: Scrutiny and sanctioning by others

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Scrutiny by others	Sanctioning by others	Hypothetical	Actual
Monitoring	0.112	0.004	-0.077	0.042
	(0.069)	(0.039)	(0.059)	(0.048)
Monitoring \times Rules	-0.159	0.149**	0.393***	0.033
	(0.151)	(0.072)	(0.132)	(0.076)
$\beta_1 + \beta_2$	-0.048	0.153	0.316	0.075
$\beta_1 + \beta_2$ p-value	0.732	0.040	0.022	0.374
Control mean	-0.002	-0.010	4.401	-0.020
Lag dep. var.	No	No	Yes	No
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	907	916	876	916

Standard errors (clustered at the village level) in parentheses p < 0.1, p < 0.05, p < 0.01

Effect on compliance and forest use

Measuring non-compliance and forest use

Non-compliance index

• Higher values if households self-report collection of (several) forest products even though collection is completely banned

• Non-compliance index 2


 Compliance with those forest use rules that were specifically targeted by the SMS reminders

• Forest use


• Self-reported and forest loss from satellite images

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Non-compliance	Non-compliance 2	Forest use
Monitoring	0.015	0.017	0.026
	(0.020)	(0.036)	(0.022)
201 2010 Dec 102 840			
Monitoring \times Rules	0.074^{*}	0.081	-0.065
	(0.040)	(0.081)	(0.064)
$\beta_1 + \beta_2$	0.089	0.098	-0.038
$\beta_1 + \beta_2$ p-value	0.027	0.208	0.554
Control mean	0.001	0.009	0.011
Lag dep. var.	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	910	960	963

Standard errors (clustered at the village level) in parentheses * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01



Note: Figure shows the coefficient estimate for the treatment indicator "Monitoring x Rules"



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Village level forest use

	(1)
	Forest use
Monitoring	0.095
	(0.101)
Monitoring*Rules	-0.078
ni san ang aragan ang ang ang ang ang ang ang ang ang	(0.229)
Control mean	.012
$\beta_1 + \beta_2$	0.017
$\beta_1 + \beta_2$ p-value	0.939
Lagged dependent variable	Yes
Controls	Yes
Observations	110

1

Village level forest use

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	Forest use	Cut trees	Animals	Kilns	Cut branches	Forest loss 1	Forest loss 2
Monitoring	0.095	0.947^{**}	-0.018	-0.024	0.047	-0.002	0.016
	(0.101)	(0.449)	(0.015)	(0.038)	(0.043)	(0.006)	(0.028)
Monitoring*Rules	-0.078	-2.037**	-0.119	- <mark>0.003</mark>	0.032	-0.003	-0.013
The second second second second	(0.229)	(0.907)	(0.104)	(0.045)	(0.052)	(0.019)	(0.058)
Control mean	.012	1.66	.045	.041	.034	.013	.032
$\beta_1 + \beta_2$	0.017	-1.090	-0.137	-0.027	0.079	-0.005	0.003
$\beta_1 + \beta_2$ p-value	0.939	0.215	0.204	0.327	0.230	0.785	0.960
Lagged dependent variable	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	110	102	102	102	102	97	98

Standard errors (clustered at the village level) in parentheses

* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Results for SMS recipients

Table D.7: Knowledge and attentiveness - SMS recipients

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Knowledge	Self-reported	Objective	Attentiveness
Monitoring	0.110*	0.097	0.134	0.034
	(0.062)	(0.062)	(0.083)	(0.065)
Monitoring \times Rules	0.239	-0.070	0.302	-0.066
	(0.148)	(0.112)	(0.190)	(0.126)
SMS recipient	0.086	0.700***	-0.083	0.623***
	(0.087)	(0.180)	(0.123)	(0.198)
$\beta_1 + \beta_2 + \beta_3$	0.434	0.728	0.353	0.591
$\beta_1 + \beta_2 + \beta_3$ p-value	0.011	0.001	0.131	0.004
Control mean	-0.031	0.000	-0.053	-0.000
Lag dep. var.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1205	1184	1205	1206

Standard errors (clustered at the village level) in parentheses p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Scrutiny of others	Sanctioning others	Hypothetical	Actual
Monitoring	0.015	-0.010	-0.015	-0.001
	(0.048)	(0.046)	(0.055)	(0.047)
Monitoring \times Rules	-0.127	-0.108	-0.096	-0.129*
	(0.081)	(0.068)	(0.092)	(0.075)
SMS recipient	0.520***	0.507***	0.470***	0.579***
	(0.150)	(0.103)	(0.107)	(0.161)
$\beta_1 + \beta_2 + \beta_3$	0.408	0.390	0.359	0.449
$\beta_1 + \beta_2 + \beta_3$ p-value	0.004	0.000	0.000	0.011
Control mean	-0.029	-0.002	-0.001	-0.000
Lag dep. var.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1204	1206	1205	1206

Table D.8: Scrutiny and sanctioning of others - SMS recipients

Standard errors (clustered at the village level) in parentheses

* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Scrutiny by others	Sanctioning by others	Hypothetical	Actual
Monitoring	0.070	-0.029	-0.051	-0.017
	(0.060)	(0.042)	(0.064)	(0.044)
Monitoring \times Rules	-0.034	0.005	0.165	-0.072
	(0.134)	(0.070)	(0.130)	(0.065)
SMS recipient	0.348***	0.050	0.166	-0.002
	(0.100)	(0.078)	(0.129)	(0.090)
$\beta_1 + \beta_2 + \beta_3$	0.384	0.026	0.280	-0.090
$\beta_1 + \beta_2 + \beta_3$ p-value	0.012	0.805	0.132	0.377
Control mean	0.000	-0.001	4.388	-0.005
Lag dep. var.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1195	1206	1193	1206

Table D.9: Scrutiny and sanctioning by others - SMS recipients

Standard errors (clustered at the village level) in parentheses


* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Non-compliance	Non-compliance 2	Forest use
Monitoring	0.033^{*}	0.034	-0.011
	(0.019)	(0.037)	(0.028)
Monitoring \times Rules	0.061*	0.044	- <mark>0.10</mark> 1
	(0.035)	(0.084)	(0.062)
SMS recipient	0.027	0.070	0.013
	(0.040)	(0.064)	(0.045)
$\beta_1 + \beta_2 + \beta_3$	0.122	0.148	-0.099
$\beta_1 + \beta_2 + \beta_3$ p-value	0.023	0.188	0.116
Control mean	-0.000	0.017	0.018
Lag dep. var.	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1205	1265	1266

Table D.10: Compliance and household forest use - SMS recipients


Standard errors (clustered at the village level) in parentheses * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Effect of community monitoring treatment




Standard errors clustered at village level for household-level results

Effect on forest loss



Effect on forest loss



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