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> Performance Information and Voting Behavior in Burkina Faso's Municipal Elections: Separating the Effects of Information Content and Information Delivery*

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October 4, 2017

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"This rose such is part of a long-term research goat-needing with Bushian Fascis Programme of eggest our collectivity territorius for FASCT. This wounds programs, finishers the spiriture date of programs of earlies and Bushian Fascis (BEGLARD), incolves a series of field experiments on numerical government performance and accountability. It has been supported by the Wood Bank and Yale University and through swearch gauget from them to the Information Challenger Fand, the Knowledge for Change Penguan, 12, and the World Bank's worstack support budget (BSE). We are grateful to Solidia Swebeigs for local coordination and to Onlik André Ouattons, Benjamin Samodogs, Jastin Yamong, Listins Sori and Swebeigs for local coordination and to Onlik André Ouattons, Benjamin Samodogs, Jastin Yamong, Listins Sori and Swebeig Fallowship and the Coordination of the Coordination of the Statistics of this study was funded by the ELLAP distribution in the Coordination of Protectly Action (BPA), and approved by Yale University Planons Subjects Consuming of Heiffell 1990) and the Institutional British of Innocessities in Protectly Action (BPA), [4] 141193. We are especially grateful to Alasane Korlibaly and Nicolas Orgetis for menaging the fieldered effort. We furthermore benedited from excellent research assistance by Lars Nordgesse. Finally, we gratefully advanceding advice, societance and data received from Bushian Fascis Independent National Electronal Commission (CEM).

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October 04, 2017