

**Authors**

Nava Ashraf  
London School of Economics and Political Science

Oriana Bandiera  
London School of Economics and Political Science

Scott Lee  
Vanderbilt University

**DO-GOODERS AND GO-GETTERS: SELECTION  
AND PERFORMANCE IN PUBLIC SERVICE  
DELIVERY\***

Nava Ashraf  
Oriana Bandiera  
Scott S. Lee  
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**Abstract**

State capacity to provide public services depends on the motivation of the agents recruited to deliver them. We design an experiment to quantify the effect of agent selection on service effectiveness. The experiment, embedded in a nationwide recruitment drive for a new government health position in Zambia, shows that agents attracted to a civil service career have more skills and ambition than those attracted to “doing good”. Data from a mobile platform, administrative records, and household surveys show that they deliver more services, change health practices, and produce better health outcomes in the communities they serve.  
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\*Ashraf: Department of Economics, LSE, [nashraf@lse.ac.uk](mailto:nashraf@lse.ac.uk); Bandiera: Department of Economics and STICERD, LSE, [obandiera@lse.ac.uk](mailto:obandiera@lse.ac.uk); Lee: Harvard Medical School and Harvard Business School, [slee@hbs.harvard.edu](mailto:slee@hbs.harvard.edu). We thank the Ministry of Health of Zambia and especially Mr. Matiano Mwanika for participation on this project. We thank the IGC, JPKI, Governance Institute, USAID and HHS (HR48) for financial support. We also thank Robert Shalizi, Charles Kagamezi, Tim Smith, Robert Duggan, Paul Gertler, Edward Gertler, Robert Jack, Christian Hamrick, Susan Hanel, Sarah Hurlbert and numerous participants at several institutions for useful comments. Adam Grant, Amy Wrzesniewski, and Patricia Sherman kindly give their guidance on presentation slides. We thank Roberto Acheam, Christopher Chikwa, Mandah Donda, Madhavi Handman, Albert Kasumba, Allen Latham, Madhavi Madhavi, Ulman Mwaanga, Shomari Ndakurwa, Sara Linn, and Sandy Tsai, for the excellent research assistance and the Clinton Health Access Initiative in Zambia for their collaboration.

# Do-Gooders and Go-Getters: Career Incentives, Selection, and Performance in Public Service Delivery

State capacity to provide public services depends on the motivation of the agents recruited to deliver them. We design an experiment to quantify the effect of agent selection on service effectiveness. The experiment, embedded in a nationwide recruitment drive for a new government health position in Zambia, shows that agents attracted to a civil service career have more skills and ambition than those attracted to “doing good”. Data from a

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