

## **Authors**

Dean Karlan Northwestern University

Sendhil Mullainathan Harvard University

Measuring Personality Traits and Predicting Loan Default with Experiments and Surveys<sup>8</sup>

Yale University

Omur Robles Bureau of Labor Statistic

January 2011

whether these traits can be used to predict the likelihood of loan default. In the first experiment we identify ubjects with high psychosomatic moral costs by observing their reactions when a bank error is made in their favor. In the second experiment we identify subjects that were less naive about their own ability to meer future comminnents. We found that both individuals with higher moral costs and individuals who were the least naive displayed lower default rates than other groups. We also explore the relationship between qualitative survey-based social capital measures and loan default. We find that survey-based between quantum survey-based sexual capital measures and foan default, we find that survey-based sexual capital measures are not predictive of loan default for these individual leaus, contrary to the results from a prior study -with group loans. Lastly, we examine whether more general personality index measures predict default, and we find that they do not. Overall, the leasons present evidence of moral hazad in microenterpensarical confile markets to the extent that they afflect choice by the horrower about whether to repay. They also show the potential for adverse selection insofar as these personality measures. are typically unobservable to the lender

JFL Classification: O16, N95 Keywords: Default, Natur Beliefs, Personality Index, Social Capital

## **Measuring Personality Traits and Predicting Loan Default with Experiments and Surveys**

We use two natural field experiments and surveys to identify character elements, and test whether these traits can be used to predict the likelihood of loan default. In the first experiment we identify subjects with high psychosomatic moral costs by observing their reactions when a bank error is made in their favor. In the second experiment we identify subjects that were less naïve about their own ability to meet future commitments. We found that both individuals with higher moral costs and individuals who were the least naïve displayed lower default rates than other groups. We also explore the relationship between

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> We thank Carinos Feria, Mathew Grant, Tomoko Horigaya, Nicole Maniello, Sang Sook Lee and Hannah Trad excellent measurch assistance: This article has benefited from the commonts of Nava Admit, Lecus Coffman, Justini Khongi, Kith Moore and participants at the Harva and Enomonic Development workshop. Any and all emors are the common and all emors are more presented and the common and the



qualitative survey-based social capital measures and loan default. We find that survey-based social capital measures are not predictive of loan default for these individual loans, contrary to the results from a prior study -with group loans. Lastly, we examine whether more general personality index measures predict default, and we find that they do not. Overall, the lessons present evidence of moral hazard in microentrepreneurial credit markets to the extent that they reflect choice by the borrower about whether to repay. They also show the potential for adverse selection insofar as these personality measures are typically unobservable to the lender.

January 01, 2011