# Are contract farming schemes a solution to improving maize productivity and profitability?

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
# **Key findings**

- Contract farming (CF) schemes are strongly associated with increased use of inputs and improved maize yields
- But, production costs under CF were much higher on average than those without
- Yield increases under CF did not compensate for these higher costs
- Profit margins under CF were lower on average than those without
- CF schemes were not profitable to farmers on average (2014/15 seasons)



# **Policy Issues**

- Maize = most important staple crop; >50% of total cereal production
- Also critical for the downstream industries
- Major investments in the sector, but persistently low yields
- Access to and adoption of improved technologies?



# **Policy Issues**

- Contract farming
  - Block farming; SADA project
  - USAID-ADVANCE; USAID-ADVANCE/GAMSAP
  - Masara scheme; Akate scheme; Numerous other schemes, mainly with aggregators
- Existing literature: mixed results, methodological challenges; focus on high-value crops
- Research questions:
  - What is the effect of CF participation on smallholder farmers' maize yields and profits in a poor, remote region?
  - How can resource-poor farmers benefit more from these CF schemes?
  - What strategies to make CF schemes more profitable and sustainable?



### **Masara scheme**

- Wienco; Yara; Masara N'arziki association
- From 2,900 farmers (2009) to 10,000+ farmers (2015)
- Written contract; fixed input package
- All grains harvested MUST be sold to Masara

### **Akate farm scheme**


- From 156 farmers (2011) to 695 farmers (2015)
- Consistent supply of quality maize for its poultry farm
- Similar to Masara scheme (some flexibility, offers tractor services, no requirement for surplus)


### **Aggregator schemes**

- 20 to 600 maize outgrowers each
- Informal (no written contract); and flexible depending on the need of farmers









- CF schemes were concentrating
- Relatively higher yields
- Dry climate (more easily dried and preserved maize)
- Highest level of poverty in Ghana (71% below the poverty line)
- Remote, making CF attractive



# **Details of the Study**

Household survey implemented in February-March 2016 (cross-sectional data, with 1-year recall, 2014-2015)

3 districts with maize CF concentration 13 communities 3 communities with CF without CF 15 households

1,261 households
3,419 plot-level for 2 periods



Up to 10 households per strata/CF

2 largest plots, CF & without CF

# **Additional data collection**

- Community-level survey
- In-depth interviews with firms and aggregators operating the maize CF schemes
- In-depth interviews with poultry and aqua feed processors



# **Methods**

### **Matching methods**

- Kernel, Nearest Neighbor, Inverse-probability-of-treatment weighting
- Rosenbaum bounds to check how sensitive the results are to hidden bias due to unobserved heterogeneity
- Critical value for bias from unobserved heterogeneity is high (more than 10 in most cases), indicating that the results are not sensitive to hidden bias caused by unobserved heterogeneity

### Instrumental variable approach

- Instrumented for participation in scheme
- Proportion of scheme j participants in the village, minus the farmer under consideration, j
- Migrant to the village



# Difference in characteristics (with and without CF)

- Small difference between those with-CF and without-CF plots and HHs
  - > female farmers among those without-scheme, implying some gender-related constraint in scheme participation
  - Not clear if wealthier HHs are more likely to participate in schemes and whether "better quality" plots are selected or not for schemes
- Some differences across schemes
  - Wealthier farmers are more likely to participate in the Masara scheme
  - Poorer households are more likely to participate in other schemes
  - Farmers under the Masara and Akate schemes have larger landholdings
  - "Better plots" appear more likely to be under Masara and Akate



# **Outcomes Being Studied**

- Input use (fertilizer, hybrid seeds, improved practices)
- Yield
- Cost per unit of maize harvested
- Profit margin




# **Results**

- Input use: CF schemes are strongly associated with increased use of inputs and improved maize yields
  - Fertilizer: 118 kg without scheme compared to 230 kg under Masara/Akate schemes and 150 kg under informal schemes
  - Certified seed: 12% farmers without scheme versus 100% under Masara/Akate scheme and 75% under informal schemes
  - Improved practices: 21% without scheme versus 78% under Masara/Akate scheme and 48% under informal schemes
- Yield: CF schemes are strongly associated with improved maize yields
  - 660 kg/acre compared to 1,230 kg/acre under Masara/Akate scheme and 720 kg/acre under informal schemes
  - Average treatment effects of CF participation on yields were 480-780 kg/acre



### Cost to produce 1 mt of maize was higher under CF



- Production costs under CF were so much higher than with CF
- Yield increases did not compensate for these higher costs on average



# **Results**

- Average profit margins are lower under CF schemes
  - 205 GHS/acre without scheme compared to 2 GHS/acre under Masara/Akate schemes and 12 GHS/acre under informal schemes
  - Average treatment effects of CF participation on PM were GHS 178 to GHS 248
- Further, profit margins were squeezed because contract terms often leave farmers with less than market prices
  - 30-40 GHS/bag maize prices under schemes versus 40-50 GHS/bag market price
  - 100-125 GHS/bag of fertilizer under schemes compared to 90 GHS/bag market price
- Farmers would voluntarily get into contract only if they make higher profits
- → 22% dropout rates from Masara and 46% from informal schemes in 2015



# Options for increasing farmer's profits under CF

- (1) Adjusting contract design → some + effect on farmers' profits
  - GHS 510–770/acre in-kind credit valued at market prices while the required repayment is GHS 810–1100/acre after five to six months during harvest season
  - 29–59% imputed interest rate
  - Increased average treatment effect from GHS246 to + GHS39
- (2) Reintroducing fertilizer subsidy (50%)  $\rightarrow$  large + effect on farmers' profits
  - Increased average treatment effect from GHS246 to + GHS150
- (3) Improving technologies being promoted in CF schemes (Pioneer 30Y87, > 50% higher yields)  $\rightarrow$  large + effects on farmers' profits
- Increased average treatment effect from GHS246 to + GHS280



# **Conclusions and Policy Lessons**

- CF schemes are critical for downstream industries
- CF offers good profits to firms and aggregators
- CF schemes were not profitable for smallholder farmers on average during 2014-2015 seasons
- Profit margins of smallholder farmers were lower on average under CF than without
- What are some options?
  - Negotiation among farmers and firms for better, fairer contract terms \*
  - Fertilizer subsidy, but there are also high social cost, leakage, and implementation challenges \*\*
  - Much-improved technologies (better performing hybrids, for example, the Pioneer 30Y87) \*\*\*



# Thank you