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These hundred million of the world's rule poor suffer from seasonal income inside unity, which offer moccuss between planting and harvest when the demand for agricultural labor fails and the price of food rises.¹ Those who under go a leansearon typically miss meabs for a two- to three-month period. This in especially problematic to program volumen and young (riblem since poor nutrition for even as for it fimes can limit in thore under the physical diverbommer. Season all hunger and dephation is perhaps the biggest challenge to the reduction of gobal poverly that has remained beging under the calar.

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\$100 bits being left on the sidewalk? A research taxan from Yale University, the London School of 60 on ensity. The University of Sydney, and Universitäris for Powerty & Kon investigated these questions in Partheen Blangladeshduring 2008-2011, testing whether providing informations or small finance at incertives, werth about the cost of a lus. Schet, monused regration and in turn, ingerover to such the Work of the Sond that households offlered either a grant or ban to migrate were substated with mere killely is und isomers to work costicle the willage during the isomsseano, and these families increased caleric infake middee to those not offlered the increase risk of those households is no se to not make the site own a year later. A reglication **Key Findin**;

Prouting an exactive to incusentate to send a associal ingrant had the following impact::-• 20-35 percent lace as in fixed and non-food expenditures for focusing the excepted the incentive and sends an ignant. • 550-700 more calories compared per person per day, equivalent to an estina meal as a event in transate in the second of the

 As much and sere a migrane.
As much as a **15 percent increase** in household income during the lean search for those offered an incentive in 2014.
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Increase in Income for poor households in those same villages not offered an incentive.

villages due to the smaller labor supply whe people moved away, indirectly berniting poor households that remained behind.

 Recurring migration Households that received incertives once were more likely to send someone to work in subsequent years (2009, 2011, 2015), even though incerties were not different in though

 Financial incentives induced migration, bu information provision by the Edit rot.

and expansion of the study during 2014-2016 not only confirmed these findings, it also showed that larger Kake engration increases wags and work hours in the village of origin, indirectly benefiting other residents who they back.

No Lean Season: Encouraging Seasonal Migration to Address Income Insecurity

Three hundred million of the world's rural poor suffer from seasonal income insecurity, which often occurs between planting and harvest when the demand for agricultural labor falls and the price of food rises. Those who undergo a lean season typically miss meals for a two- to three-month period. This is especially problematic for pregnant women and young children since poor nutrition for even a short time can limit long-term cognitive and physical development. Seasonal hunger and deprivation is perhaps the biggest challenge to the reduction of global poverty that has remained largely under the radar.



Members of some families in poor rural areas migrate to urban areas for work to cope with seasonal deprivation. In Bangladesh, however, researchers observed that many vulnerable households, who could potentially reap large benefits from temporary migration, didn't send anyone away to work, thereby risking hunger. Why weren't more people migrating? Would these households improve food security if they were to send a migrant to these areas during the lean season? More broadly, why were so many people sticking around in relatively unproductive rural areas, in the face of persistent gaps in wages and productivity between urban and rural areas? Was this akin to the proverbial \$100 bills being left on the sidewalk?

A research team from Yale University, the London School of Economics, the University of Sydney, and Innovations for Poverty Action investigated these questions in Northern Bangladesh during 2008-2011, testing whether providing information or small financial incentives, worth about the cost of a bus ticket, increased migration and in turn, improved household welfare. They found that households offered either a grant or loan to migrate were substantially more likely to send someone to work outside the village during the lean season, and those families increased caloric intake relative to those not offered the incentives. Many of those households chose to re-migrate on their own a year later. A replication and expansion of the study during 2014-2016 not only confirmed these findings, it also showed that larger scale emigration increases wages and work hours in the village of origin, indirectly benefiting other residents who stay back.

Read about Evidence Action's scale-up of the program here.

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