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FREE DISTRIBUTION OR COST-SHARING? EVIDENCE FROM A RANDOMIZED MALARIA PREVENTION EXPERIMENT

JESSICA COHEN AND PASCALINE DUPAS

It is often argued that cost-sharing—changing a subsidized, positive price—for a health product is recessary to avoid wasting resources on those who will not use or do not send the product. We explore this argument through a field experiment in Kenya, in which we rendomized the price at which prenated clinics until sell-leng-leating arithmalized insection-treated before set which prenated clinics until sell-leng-leating arithmalized insection-treated before the test Baby be use those who will set use the product: women who received free ITNs are not less likely to use them than those who paid subsidized positive prices. We also find no evidence that contabaring induces selection of women who need the net more those who pay higher prices appear no sicker than the aevening prenated client in the area in terms of measured asserties and important indicator of malariai. Cost-sharing dose, however, considerably designed element-We first that speake deep be visity percentage points when the price of ITNs increases from zero to 80.00 (i.e., from 100% to 90% solids); a price still \$0.15 below the price at which TINs are currently sold to programt women in Kenya. We combine our estimates in a cost-offert increase analysis of the impact of ITN prices on child mortality that increases analysis of the impact of ITN prices on child mortality that increases and of ITNs coald saw many more lives than cost-sharing gauge are no have achieved as far, and, given the large positive externality associated with widespread usage of ITNs, would likely do so at a lesser cost per 186 sarred.

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## Free Distribution or Cost-Sharing? Evidence from a Randomized Malaria Prevention Experiment

It is often argued that cost-sharing—charging a subsidized, positive price—for a health product is necessary to avoid wasting resources on those who will not use or do not need the product. We explore this argument through a field experiment in Kenya, in which we randomized the price at which prenatal clinics could sell long-lasting antimalarial insecticide-treated bed nets (ITNs) to pregnant women. We find no evidence that cost-sharing reduces wastage on those who will not use the product: women who received free ITNs are not less likely to use them than those who paid subsidized positive prices. We also find no evidence



that costsharing induces selection of women who need the net more: those who pay higher prices appear no sicker than the average prenatal client in the area in terms of measured anemia (an important indicator of malaria). Cost-sharing does, however, considerably dampen demand. We find that uptake drops by sixty percentage points when the price of ITNs increases from zero to \$0.60 (i.e., from 100% to 90% subsidy), a price still \$0.15 below the price at which ITNs are currently sold to pregnant women in Kenya. We combine our estimates in a cost-effectiveness analysis of the impact of ITN prices on child mortality that incorporates both private and social returns to ITN usage. Overall, our results suggest that free distribution of ITNs could save many more lives than cost-sharing programs have achieved so far, and, given the large positive externality associated with widespread usage of ITNs, would likely do so at a lesser cost per life saved.

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